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1 Justice beyond Boundaries 
There is, I think, little doubt that we now need an account of jus-
tice that stretches beyond boundaries. Many activities, processes and 
powers have always had effects that reached beyond boundaries of var-
ious sorts. Processes such as climate change, activities that may cause 
harm on a vast scale-such as uses of nuclear or bio-chemical weapons--
are no respecters of boundaries; policies for dealing with them also 
cannot respect boundaries. There are other activities and processes, 
such as trade and pollution, which do not invariably spread across bound-
aries, but have done so for many centuries. Yet other activities and 
processes have recently begun to cross boundaries on an unprecedented 
scale: they include flows of capital, of information (and misinforma-
tion), of technologies and of crime. Yet other activities and processes, 
such as flows of migrants and asylum seekers, are still more or less reg-
ulated by various sorts of boundaries. All of these cross-boundary 
flows maybe altered and their effects magnified or reduced by adopt-
ing one or another policy, hence all raise questions of justice. 
It is not obvious how we should now speak of those aspects of jus-
tice that are concerned with activities and processes that cross bound-
aries. Traditionally the term international justice has been used, but it 
has evident infelicities. In the first place, the units whose boundaries 
may--or may not-be crossed by various activities are seldom na-
tions, and rather more frequently states; few of them are nation-states. 
However, terms such as interstatal justice and intergovernmental justice 
are hardly more apt, since some of the processes and activities of most 
concern elude or bypass the control of states and governments. An 
adequate account of justice and boundaries has to take note of the 
activities powerful non-state actors, ranging from corporations to 
non-governmental bodies, from criminal networks to UN institutions, 
whose location and boundaries are often not well-defined. The term 
transnational justice shares some of the deficiencies of the term inter-
national justice. On the other hand the popular phrases global justice 
and cosmopolitan justice are too easily understood as presupposing that 
the outcome of a discussion of justice and boundaries must be uni-
tary system of justice for the entire globe, hence as begging con-
tentious questions. I have therefore settled on the deliberately minimal 
phrase justice across boundaries as a starting point. In using this term 
I assume only that where processes and activities can cross boundaries, 
reasons would have to be given for thinking that should or should 
not be permitted to do so. 
2 Reason and the Scope of Justice 
To many people the very idea that (aspects of) justice might have 
unrestricted scope seems counterintuitive. They may note that jus-
tice has been thought of since antiquity as a political or civic virtue, 
or insist that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions", 1 and sus-
pect that uncoupling the link between justice and political units 
(whatever these may be at a given time) will be incoherent. 
I believe that this thought is convincing only if we assume that a 
system of just states will itself be just. But this claim is implausible. 
Of course, we can imagine a certain sort of plurality of states which 
would be just provided that each state was just. For example, a set of 
just states without mutual influence or effects (imagine that they are 
located on different continents in a pre-modern world, or on differ-
ent planets today) would be just. But the system of states in the vari-
ous forms in which it has existed in recent centuries is not like this. 
The prospects and powers of states, and the structures they can es-
tablish internally, are always shaped by their relations with other 
states, by the forms of dependence and interdependence and the sorts 
of threats and risks, opportunities and advantages that each state pre-
sents to others. It is uncontentious that there are relations of power 
and domination among states, and that interstatal relationships can 
be major sources of injustice. Nobody who reflects on the unhappy 
history of the twentieth century could think othenvise. 
In raising questions about the justice ofboundaries I shall not be 
concerned with the justice or injustice of their location-a venerable 
and contentious topic in many parts of the world-but with bound-
aries as an institution. Boundaries do not have the simplicity that their 
linear representation on maps misleadingly suggests. They are not 
simply demarcations between all activities and processes occurring in 
one domain and all activities and processes occurring in an adjacent 
domain. It would perhaps be more accurate to think of boundaries 
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as systems of filters, which can be constructed and adjusted in many 
different ways. Boundaries can range from the 'supernormal' bound-
aries offormer East Germany, which were virtually impenious to cap-
ital and people, and permitted only a highly regulated and limited flow 
of goods and information, to the wholly porous, invisible and often ill-
defined demarcations which even today are all that can be found in 
many frontier regions. In short, boundaries are complex social and 
political institutions whose form and function can be changed and ad-
justed without changing their location. 2 Boundaries, like other insti-
tutions, are therefore appropriate matters for challenge and criticism. 
All questions about location apart, the justice of boundaries, and of 
changes that might be made in the way they regulate and filter the pas-
sage of goods and money, people and information, technologies and 
ways of life, represents a m;~or challenge for political philosophy. 
These preliminary thoughts about boundaries show very little about 
the appropriate way to address the justice of boundaries in political 
philosophy. On some views, both traditional and recent, justice b~ 
yond boundaries is an important topic, but a theory of justice should 
nevertheless begin with an account of a just community, society or state, 
and only then proceed as a second chapter to an account of justice across 
boundaries. On other views, beginning with an account of justice within 
boundaries may compromise or even vitiate any subsequent attempt 
to provide a convincing account of justice beyond boundaries. 
These issues might be addressed in many ways. In this lecture I shall 
try to say something about the starting points that we might choose 
for an account of justice that can cross boundaries. I shall look briefly 
at some of the implications of a communitarian starting point, but my 
main focus will be on two very different conceptions of' public reason' 
which might provide starting points for an account of justice. One is 
used by .John Rawls both in Political Liberalism (1993) and in The Ltzw 
of Peoples (1999); the other was proposed by Kant in a number of works, 
but in particular in his later political writings. 
Rawls and K.'lnt each advance what may be loosely called a semi-
cosmopolitan view of justice: neither endorses a world state, but each 
thinks that there is more to justice than 'domestic' or 'internal' jus-
tice. I shall not however say very much about the specific institutional 
proposals for international justice Rawls and Kant put forward. There 
are two reasons for this. The main one is that comparisons between 
proposals that address such different worlds may mislead. Kant's pro-
posals were in their day a remarkable blend of realism and radical think-
ing. Writing at time when there were few republican states and no full 
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democracies, he proposes a league of republican states which ac-
knowledge certain rights not only for their own citizens but for oth-
ers. By contrast, Rawls's proposals for justice across boundaries are quite 
conservative. Writing at a time at which the United Nations and its or-
ganisations, the world bank and various international courts all exist, 
he suggests that international justice will require these sorts of insti-
tutions. My second reason for saying rather little about the specifici-
ties is that much has already been said-by Habermas, by Pogge and 
by many others. 3 But in my view rather little has been said about the 
respective starting points, so it is to these that I shall tum. For reasons 
that will become clear, I shall discuss Rawls before Kant. 
3 Communitarians and Justice beyond Boundaries 
Before turning to Rawls, it is useful to call to mind the communi-
tarian views he opposes. A merit of communitarian thought is that it 
incorporates a strong view of the basis of practical reasoning, which it 
views as grounded in the categories, norms and practices of actual com-
munities and their cultures. Altltough this move may seem arbitrary 
from the point of view of outsiders, it is anchored in a conception of 
human identity as shaped by the constitutive norms and practices of 
the communities and traditions of which a given individual is part, and 
so offers substantial premises for working out an account of justice and 
other normative issues appropriate to that community. These norms 
and practices are, to use a useful Hegelian phrase, seen as nichl hinter-
gehbar: there is no going behind them. Since they are constitutive of 
the identity of the community or tradition, and so ofits members, there 
is no deeper range of premises which could provide the basis for chal-
lenging these norms. 
Communitarians are not unaware of the possibility that the con-
stitutive norms of communities and traditions may change, indeed be 
changed by those within a community. They see the categories and 
values of communities as open to revision in the light of its internal 
conceptual resources. Hence it would be a mistake to think that com-
munitarian reasoning is inevitably conservative. However, I believe that 
it would not be mistaken to think that reasoning that proceeds within 
the constraints set by the categories, norms and other resources of a 
community or tradition must inevitably be ethnocentric. Communi-
tarian reasoning is inevitably insiders' reasoning, and takes no account 
of the categories, tlte concerns or the views of outsiders. This does not, 
of course, mean that communitarians can have no view of the proper 
treatment of out'iiders: they might be convinced of the merits of ex-
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elusion or of integration, of neglect or of assimilation, or perhaps 
(more worryingly) of marginalisation, colonisation or extermination. 
However, they do not think that there could be reasoned dialogue with 
unassimilated outsiders, with whom neither categories nor norms, nor 
therefore the means of reasoning, are shared. 
Although communitarians take a realistic view of the possibilities 
for change within any given tradition, I believe that they take an un-
realistic view of the boundaries between traditions and communities. 
Political boundaries form highly variable filters; the cultural bound-
aries which communitarian reasoning is chiefly concerned with are yet 
more diverse and malleable. Many people are inward with thecate-
gories and norms of a number of traditions; those who arc not initially 
familiar with the thought of some community can often grasp a good 
deal about others' categories and norms, and therefore about their rea-
soning. (For evidence consider the amazing spread of the rhetoric of 
rights). Sense of identity is not invariably anchored in the actual 
norms and categories of a single community; even where it is, the ways 
of thought and life of that community may allow understanding of and 
by a fair range of outo;iders. Like the rest of us, communitarians in fact 
hold that foreigners and other culmral outsiders are persons with 
whom we can communicate if not perfectly still a great deal, and that 
trade and translation, travel and collaboration are real possibilities. In 
my view these everyday assumptions undermine the plausibility of any 
communitarian conception of practical reason and show that it does 
not offer a convincing basis for reasoning either about domestic jus-
tice or about justice beyond boundaries. 
However, reasoning that does not invoke culturally specific cate-
gories and norms will be considerably impoverished. It is not obvious 
what alternative premises for practical reasoning will be available. 
Once we allow that not all reasoning about justice can take advantage 
of the rich conceptual resources of a tradition or community we must 
look for an alternative account of practical reason. One obvious di-
rection in which to look is at john Rawls's work, and in particular at 
his later work, in which he both advances a conception of practical rea-
son as public reason and addresses the question of justice beyond 
boundaries. 
4 Rawls on Public Reason 
In Political Liberali.sm and in The Law of Peoples, which includes a sep-
arate essay on 'The Idea of Public Reason',john Rawls explicitly re-
jects the underlying assumption of the communitarian pr~jcct: 
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"pluralism is not seen as a disaster but rather as the natural outcome 
of human reason under enduring free institutions".4 If this is the case, 
there will be no way to identify constitutive categories and norms for 
the very units for which Rawls thinks questions of justice primarily arise. 
justice, as he sees it, has its context in a "bounded society", a perpet-
ually continuing scheme of co-operation which persons enter only by 
birth and leave only by death, and which is self-sufficient. 5 Within each 
bounded society, reasonable persons will not come to complete agree-
ment about ethical matters and may be expected to form differing 'con-
ceptions of the good'. However, as reasonable they may be expected 
to accept a form of reciprocity, namely to be "ready to propose prin-
ciples and standards as fair terms of co-operation and to abide by 
them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so".6 Rea-
sonable persons are committed to a conception of public reason, and 
prepared to work out the framework for the public social world they 
share, to construct the principles of justice by which they will live to-
gether despite irresolvable ethical disagreements. Public reason, as Rawls 
construes it, is "citizens' reasoning in the public forum about consti-
tutional essentials and basic questions ofjustice".7 Evidently this con-
ception of public reason as reciprocity between fellow citizens 
presupposes the constitutive institutions which define fellow citizen-
ship: the bounded society, the constitutional basis of citizenship (lib-
eral rights and democracy in Rawls's account). This essentially civic 
conception of public reason is coupled with what we might view as an 
associative conception of practical reasoning for lesser spheres (Rawls 
calls this 'non-public reason'; his thought is close to Kant's views on 
'private reason ')8• In short, although Rawls's conception of public rea-
son in Political Liberalism does not assume the shared culture that 
communitarian reasoning presupposes, it does presuppose shared 
political arrangements, including boundaries, liberal democracy, and 
citizenship. It is a nice question whether the boundaries that are pre-
supposed are-contrary to Rawls's intentions-in fact state boundaries. 
On the one hand he claims only to presuppose a 'bounded society', 
on the other hand the assumption that nobody enters except by birth 
or leaves except by death suggests that the boundaries of such a polity 
are well policed, that force is exercised, indeed monopolised, within 
the territory in question. And this is the Weberian definition of a state. 
These issues are discussed in more detail in Rawls's Tile Law of Peo-
ples. Here he argues that issues of justice beyond boundaries are to be 
approached by considering public reasoning as conducted by peoples. 
He rejects both the communitarian thought that the basis of reason-
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ing is to be culturally defined (a community, a tradition), and the 
thought that the parties who consider justice beyond boundaries are 
to be thought of either as individuals or as states.9 Liberal peoples are 
thought of as inhabiting their own territories, and as negotiating stand-
ards of international justice (here the term may be apt) with other lib-
eral peoples, as well as with those non-liberal peoples who have what 
Rawls calls a 'decent hierarchical society'. Rawls believes that the prin-
ciples that would be mutually accepted will include those of non-ag-
gression, non-intervention except in self defence (and sparingly to end 
grave violations of human rights) .10 He also thinks that reasonable peo-
ples are likely to agree on some version of the UN organisations, some 
form of World Bank and some form of global trade agreement. 11 Rea-
sonable peoples also, he thinks, have some duty to help heavily bur-
dened societies, so that all have the means of life; but the difference 
principle is not to be extended intemationally.12 Since the procedures 
ofRawlsian public reasoning are specified only in very general terms, 
it is hard to be sure whether or in what conditions there would be mu-
tual agreement on these or other specific arrangements; in particular 
it is hard to see whether and why reasonable peoples would not agree 
to a more extended view of duties of richer towards towards poorer 
societies. 
The conception of the state that Rawls rejects in The Law of Peoples 
is in my view indeed a pretty unpromising basis for any account of jus-
tice beyond boundaries. What he rejects is the realist conception of 
states as "anxiously concerned with their power-their capacity (mil-
itary, economic, diplomatic)-to influence others and always guided 
by their basic interests". 13 However, this has always been an idealised, 
indeed ideologised conception of the state, and it is certainly not the 
only option. 
In fact, the conception of a 'people' on which Rawls builds his ac-
count of justice beyond boundaries is a remarkably state-like concep-
tion, based on the protection of territory and self-interest: 
Liberal peoples do, however, have their fundamental interests 
as permitted by their conceptions of right and justice. They seek 
to protect their territory, to ensure the security and safety of their 
citizens, and to preserve their free political institutions and the 
liberties and free culture of their civil society. 14 
Evidently Rawls conceives of peoples as politically organised, and 
as able to appoint representatives15 through whom they are to reason 
about justice beyond boundaries. In short, peoples are conceived as 
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having all the powers capacities and features of states, apart from one 
very specific feature: 
What distinguishes peoples from states- and this is crucial- is 
that just peoples are fully prepared to grant the very same 
proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equal.16 
In Rawls's view, peoples can be reasonable, but states are wedded 
to rational self-interest. 
Rawls's choice of peoples rather than states as the agents whose de-
liberations are basic to justice beyond boundaries is, I think, motivated 
in large part by the inaccurate assumption that states must be ideal typ-
ical structures that fit the realist paradigm. Yet states as we have actu-
ally known them have always fallen far short of that paradigm. 17 The 
conception of states and governments as having limited powers, and 
as observing certain fundamental principles over and above the pur-
suit of rational self-interest, is part and parcel of the liberal tradition 
of political philosophy, and central to contemporary international 
politics. States as they have really existed and exist never had and never 
have unlimited sovereignty, internal or external-although some the-
orists of sovereignty, some proponents of strategic reasoning, some hawks 
in powerful states, and some romantic nationalists without powerful 
states have made grandiose claims. States a.s they currently exist are com-
mitted by numerous treaty obligations to a limited conception of sov-
ereignty, and there is nothing contradictory about this commitment, 
although like other commitments it is sometimes not honoured. Peo-
ples, as they may once have existed independently of state structures prob-
ably did not have bounded territories; those peoples who have the means 
to negotiate with other peoples, to keep outsiders out and to make agree-
ments, have them because they have state and governmental structures. 
It is not hard to see what leads Rawls to this quite distinctive view 
of the basis for thinking about international justice. Since he has pro-
posed an account of public reason that focuses on the notion of reci-
procity among agents, he has to determine who tl1e relevant agents shall 
be, among whom reciprocity is to be achieved, or not. Since he as-
sumes that the only conception of the state is the realist conception, 
according to which states act solely from self interest and will not be 
capable of reciprocity, these agents cannot be states. By default, the 
reasonable agents who arc to carry the burden of international nego-
tiation across boundaries are seen as peoples. Yet in reality the only 
peoples who have firm boundaries and the capacity to negotiate with 
outsiders on a sustained and perhaps reasonable basis are those peo-
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pies with states. There is something laborious about anchoring an ac-
count of reasoning to a conception of territorial agents who may not 
be well exemplified in our world, and if they were exemplified would 
acquire the political capacities Rawls imputes to them only through 
state and governmental structures which his argument rejects. 
5 Kant: Public Reason as Non-Derivative 
Rawls views his philosophy ao; in many w·.tys Kantian, and makes fre-
quent references to Kant's in his writing on justice across boundaries. 
However, he also, and in my view rightly, distances his work from 
.Kant's. In 11u? Law of Peopks he writes: 
Since my presentation of the Law of Peoples is greatly indebted 
to Kant's idea of Joedus jmcificum and to so much in his thought, 
I should say the following: at no point are we deducing the prin-
ciples of right and justice, or decency, or the principles of ra-
tionality, from a conception of practical reason in the 
background. Rather, we are gi\ing content to an idea of prac-
tical reason and three of its component parts, the ideas of rea-
sonableness, decency and rationality. The criteria for these three 
normative ideas are not deduced, but enumerated and char-
acterized in each case. Practical reasoning as such is simply rea-
soning about what to do, or reasoning about what institutions 
and policies are reasonable, decent, or rational and why. There 
is no list of necessary or sufficient conditions for each of these 
three ideas ... Ill 
As Rawls sees it, Kant's reliance on an account of practical reason 
has unacceptable metaphysical presuppositions.19 Kant, by contrast, 
does seck to derive his account of justice from an account of practical 
reason. But I do not think that it follows that Kant's conceptions of 
ethics, of justice and of international justice must be derived from 
transcendental idealism under a strongly metaphysical interpretation. 
Kant's writings on public reason provide relatively accessible argu-
ments which do not draw on metaphysical ao;sumptions, yet aim to vin-
dicate a specific conception of practical reason: they can be given, indeed 
they invite, an anti-metaphysical reading.211 
The central thought of Kant's account of public reason is that the 
standards of reason cannot be derivative. Any appeal to other, exter-
nal authorities to buttress our reasoning must fail. Just as a learner cy-
clist who clutches at passing ol~ccts and leans on them to gain his balance 
thereby fails to balance at all, so a would-be reasoner who leans on some 
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socially or civilly constituted power and authority which lacks reasoned 
vindication fails to reason. 
This view is explicit in the quite distinctive way that Kant characterises 
the difference between his conceptions of publicand private uses of rea-
son in various works of the 1780's and 1790's.21 Here I shall refer only 
to two short essays of the 1780's, neglecting other extended discussions 
of public and private reason.22 In these writings Kant characterises uses 
of reason that appeal to rationally ungrounded assumptions, such as 
the civilly constituted authority of Church or state, not as public but as 
private. In What is enlightenment? he speaks of the reasoning of military 
officers, of pastors of the established Church and of civil servants in car-
rying out their roles as private. these functionaries derive their author-
ity from their civil or public office, and their official communications 
assume without argument the authority and the edicts of that civil 
power and the rules of office that it has instituted. Kant states quite ex-
plicitly that "the private use of reason is that which one may make ofit 
in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted" 23 It follows 
that the sorts of reasoning exhibited in democratic political debate and 
in communitarian thought. as well as in the civic reasoning Rawls com-
mends, are all in Kant's view private, or at least as not fully public, because 
each appeals to the authority of civilly and socially constituted roles, 
institutions and practices. Rawlsian peoples are not in fact identifiable 
independently of the constitutive institutional structures that secure their 
territories, distinguish citizen from non-citizen, and enable their dem-
ocratic government, including that part of democratic government 
which counts as foreign policy: hence Kant would see their reasoning 
as less than fully public. 
Kant himself offers a quite different view of (fully) public reason 
as intrinsically non-derivative. He contrasts all 'private' uses of reason 
with "the public use of one's own reason ... which someone makes of 
it as a scholar before the entire public of the world ofreaders",24 a scholar 
"who by his writings speaks to the public in the strict sense, that is, the 
world".25 
In these and many other texts Kant sets out a dilemma. If we ap-
peal to any civilly or socially constituted powers or authorities, let 
alone to mere brute force-if we try to constrain or control attempts 
to reason-we lose the very justifications we seek. Discourse that is sub-
ordinated to authorities that lack reasoned vindication achieves at 
best restricted scope and authority. Those who buttress their conclu-
sions by appealing to authorities they do not vindicate end up relying 
on the dubious merits of an argument from authority. 
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6 Kant: Public Reason as Freedom without Lawlessness 
Kant's criticism of private uses of reason is both convincing and pro~ 
lematic. It is convincing because it is clear enough what the appeal to 
contingently available authorities amounts to-the introduction of 
some arbitrary premise asserting the claims of that authority; and dear 
enough what it costs-the relativisation of conclusions to that arbitrary 
premise. It is easy to agree that reasoning is limited as soon as it is be-
holden to any civilly constituted authority, indeed to any contingent 
power or authority for which no justification is provided, and that this 
independence is the condition of reaching audiences of wider scope. 
It is easy to see how this Kantian criticism of private reason can be ex-
tended to undermine attempts to develop democratic, communitarian and 
even Rawlsian-in short, civic-conceptions of public reason. 
However, it is less easy to understand what we are going to be left 
with when all appeal to 'alien' authorities is set aside. Kant's favoured 
image of public reason is scholarly communication with the world at 
large. It has evident limitations. Perhaps Kant could find no better 
image of non-derivative reasoning than tl1is; but we are more suspicious, 
and in my view rightly suspicious, about the relations between power 
and knowledge. Practices of scholarly communication include and ex-
dude, highlight and suppress. Can we seriously expect to find or to 
live by communicative practices which are do not introduce unargued 
assumptions-even if these assumptions change through history? (I 
personally doubt whether the much heralded emerging global com-
munication regime, which some see as the basis for a deeper democ-
ratisation of political life, lives up the Kantian ideal of public reason 
any better than the communication among scholars to which Kant 
pointo;.) 
Can we expect to say anytllingabout the requirements of reasoned 
communication, other than making the negative point that it fails wher-
ever it merely defers to the edicts and assumptions of civil or other 
powers or authorities? Reasoning surely cannot be merely a matter 
of discourse that does not defer-for if this were the case, every sort 
of gibberish and incoherence would count as reasoned, provided 
only that it does not draw on the authority or edict<> of whatever pow-
ers there be. 
Clearly K.mt thinks that we can say more about the demands ofpu~ 
lie reason. He never maintains that reasoning has merely to be free and 
non-deferential. He seto; out the other requirements of reasoning rather 
clearly in 'What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?, which was pu~ 
lished quite soon after What is enlightenment?. In the second essay he 
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argues that nothing could deserve to be called reason if it was wholly 
without structure and discipline, because a minimal condition for any 
discourse to count as reasoned is that it be communicable. Reasons arc 
the sorts of things that we give and receive, accept or refuse. He re-
jects the idea that reasons could be devised by the arbitrary fiat of in-
dividual reasoners: 
... how much and how correctly would we think if we did not think 
as it were in community with others to whom we communicate 
our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us! 26 
The standards of reason cannot be found in solitary thinking: on 
the contrary those who seek to reason must structure their thought, 
speech and communication in ways that others can follow. 
At times Kant uses a fiercely sarcastic rhetoric27 to chastise those 
who try to purvey the illusion that reasoning could be ·without all struc-
ture or discipline and delude themselves that this 'lawless' freedom will 
be liberating. He had clear targets in mind, including the fans of re-
ligious enthusiasm (Schwarmerei) and of exaggerated views of the 
powers of genius; today his targets might include a fair range of post-
modernists, new-agers and deconstructionists. In each case he believes 
that the opponents of reason fail to see that the unstructured libera-
tion of thought and discourse which they crave will be a disaster: 
.. .if reason will not subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it has 
to bow under the yoke oflaws given by another; for without law, 
nothing-not even nonsense-can play its game for long. Thus 
the unavoidable consequence of declared lawlessness in think-
ing (ofliberation from the limitations of reason) is that the free-
dom to think will ultimately be forfeited ... 28 
The illusions of 'lawless' thinking end, Kant thinks, not merely in 
intellectual confusion, but in lack of defences against the very sorts of 
deference and subordination which enthusiasts for lawless thinking wish 
to escape. Because anarchic, 'lawless' thinking is no more than bab-
ble, it is defenceless in the face of the claims of superstition, of en-
thusiasm and of religious and political dogma. 
7 Kant: Public Reason as Law-like 
If 'lawless' thinking ends not in freedom of thought and commu-
nication, but in gibberish and isolation, even in superstition and cog-
nitive disorientation, whose political consequences include vulnerability 
to tyrants and demagogues, then any activity in human life that can 
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count as reasoned must be structured. This structure must enable us 
to distinguish good reasons from poor reasons, to decide which we 
ought to accept and which we ought to reject. Reasoning whether the-
oretical or practical will lack authority and normative force if it has no 
stnacture by which this distinction can be made So if anything is to 
count as more than 'priv.ne' reason, in Kant's sense of the term, if there 
is to be anything that is to count as fully public reason, then it must 
have a structure which it does not derive from existing institutions and 
practices. What then can provide the intemal, non-derivative discipline 
or structure of fully public reasoning? K.mt's answer is straightfor-
ward: 
Freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws 
expect tluue which it gives itself; and its opposite is the maxim of 
a lawless use of reason ... 29 
Public uses of reason must have law-like rather than lawless struc-
ture, but since they are not to derive their law-likeness from any ex-
temal sources, it will have to be freely chosen: the discipline of reason 
is that of self-kgislatio11 or autorwmy. 
Kant's identification of reason with autonomy is initially starding, 
despite the fact that the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals makes it 
plain that practical reason is to be identified with autonomy.:lll The 
reason that it is startling is surely that the contemporary conception 
of autonomy identifies it with independence rather than with reason. 
Kant, however, never equates autonomy with mere freedom or with 
independence.31 Unlike most recent 'Kantian' writers (and many of 
their critics), he views autonomy or self legislation as emphasising not 
some (rather amazing sort oj) self that does the legislati11g, but rather legisla-
tion that is not borrowed from others, that is 110t clerivalive, that is therefore 
freely chosen, lmd yet has the fonn of law. Non-derivative 'legislation' can-
not require us to adopt the actual laws or rules of some institution or 
authority; it can be only a matter of requiring .that any principle we 
use to structure thought or action be law-like, that it have 'the form of 
law'. Only those who freely choose principles that have the 'form of 
law' meet the demands of Kantian autonomy; only they show com-
mitment to public reason. This is why Kmn can write: 
Now the power to judge autonomously-that is, freely (ac-
cording to principles of thought in general)-is called rea-
son.32 
Another way of making the same point is to note d1at Kant identi-
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fies public reason with a double modal criterion: with the requirement 
of structuring our discourse in ways in which (we believe) others can 
follow. A general statement of this criterion can be found at the end 
of What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?, where Kant identifies 
reasoning with the practice of adopting principles of thinking and act-
ing that have the form oflaw, which can be adopted by all: 
To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask 
oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether 
one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on 
which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of 
reason.33 
We are most of us more familiar with a restricted version of this 
principle, formulated specifically for the domain of action, which Kant 
labels 'the supreme principal of practical reason' or 'the Categorical 
Imperative'. The best known of these more restricted formulations is 
the Formula of Universal Law version of the Categorical Imperative, 
whose double modal structure is particularly plain: 'act only in accord-
ance with that maxim through which you can at the same time wiU that it be-
come a universal law'. 34 
8 Kant and Domestic Justice 
Where does this account of the vindication of practical reason take 
Kant's account of justice, and specifically of justice beyond boundaries? 
I shall first comment briefly of Kant's account of domestic or 'inter-
nal' justice. His justification of political institutions does not appeal 
simply to a version of social contract35 or contractarian thought but 
to a more abstract Universal Principle of justice. A particularly clear for-
mulation of this principle is given early in the Doctrine of Right (the first 
part of the Metaphysics of Morals). It runs: 
Any action is rigid if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in 
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom 
of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in ac-
cordance with a universallaw.36 
The Universal Principle of justice makes no explicit reference to con-
sent. Its justification lies rather in its relationship to the formulae of 
the Categorical Imperative, and so to Kant's vindication of practical 
reason as grounded in the necessary conditions for any possible fully 
public reasoning. Kant's argument for justice begins simply from the 
requirement that reason be fully public, in the sense that it never in-
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voke arbitrary authority, hence can be followed in thought or adopted 
in action by all, without presupposing any pre-established agreement, 
shared ideology or religion or other given source of coordination. 
The most familiar statement of this requirement for the domain 
of practical reason is the Formula of Universal Law version of the Cat-
egorical Imperative. This principle covers maxims-practical princi-
ples-for all sorts of action, inward and outward, personal and public. 
By contrast the Universal Principle of Justice is restricted in two ways. First, 
it is concerned only with maxims for outward action, that is with the 
aspects of action which could be enforced (hence not, for example, 
with maxims for virtue or with moral worth). Second, it is concerned 
only with maxims for structuring individuals' external freedom, that 
is with maxims for shaping the public domain, so not with maxims for 
other outward aspects of individual conduct, such as the outward as-
pects of duties to self or personal relations. The Universal Principle of 
Justice requires the rejection of any basic maxims for structuring the 
domain of the external use of freedom which could not be adopted 
by all. 
Kant thinks that the implementation of this principle in the actual 
conditions in which we live is not straightforward. We find ourselves 
living on a spherical and finite globe that brings us into contact with 
others and competing with them for scarce resources; and we are not 
reliably altruistic.37 In our world external freedom will therefore be 
insecure without at least a limited form of coercion, aimed at 'hindering 
the hindrances of freedom'. In these conditions the Universal Princi-
ple of Justice can be best implemented by establishing states with re-
publican constitutions, which guarantee freedom within the law at least 
within a certain territories, although they can do so only by coercive 
use of a conditional form of state power. Kant justifies state power not 
as an intrinsic requirement of justice, but as the compromise which 
we have to make under actual conditions. 
A succinct formulation of this compromise is given in Kant's state-
ment of the elements of a republican constitution: 
A constitution established, first on principles of the freedom of 
the member of a society ... second on principles ofthe dependence 
of all upon a single common legislation ... third, on the law of 
their equality (as citizens of a state)-thc sole constitution ... on 
which all rightful legislation of a people must be based-is a re-
publican constitution.38 
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Republican justice is evidently not democratic justice, but I do not 
think it is trivial. Consider how much it rules out. Societies or states 
which do not secure the rule of law (anarchic or despotic societies) 
undermine or jeopardise external freedom for some or for all, so base 
their constitution on a principle which cannot be a principle for all 
and are unjust. Societies or states which leave some persons above or 
outside the law (monarchies, dictatorships, states within states, slave 
states) undermine or jeopardise external freedom for some or for all, 
so base their constitution on a principle which cannot be a principle 
for all, so are unjust. Societies or states which do not secure equality 
of status for all citizens under law (feudalism, caste societies, patriar-
chal societies) undermine or jeopardise external freedom for some or 
for all, so base their constitution on a principle which cannot be a prin-
ciple for all, so are unjust. It may be that Kant's account of domestic 
justice could be improved by showing that the abolition of gender 
discrimination and the institution of full democracy are also compo-
nents of a just constitution. 
9 Kant On Justice Beyond Boundaries. 
I want now to indicate quite briefly some advantages of an ap-
proach to justice across boundaries based on Kant's conception of pub-
lic reason. The first advantage is that his conception of public reason 
does not presuppose the status quo; it merely insists on the modal con-
ditions that all discourse must meet if it is to be fully public. If any-
thing can count as a vindication of reason, as opposed to mere assertion 
that something is reasonable because it is liked, or accepted, even 
liked or accepted by lots of people, or even by a people, this seems to 
me the most promising strategy. 
The second advantage is a corollary of the first. Because he has 
offered a vindication of reason, Kant has no need to presuppose any 
institutional structures in arguing for the basic principles of justice: 
he can address the agenda of seeing which principles would and 
which would not be reasonable without begging questions. In Kant's 
thought human rights, democracy, state power and (some sorts of) 
boundaries arc 
The approach has several further advantages. Kant docs not ground 
his account of justice in the realist conception of the state, with its eth-
ically disreputable disregard of the moral standing of some of those 
with whom we in fact interact across boundaries, and to whose suffer-
ing we may contribute. Nor does he argue for a merely abstract cos-
mopolitanism.39 Nor does he anchor justice in the puzzling conception 
16 
of a tenitorial people who lack a state but police their boundaries tightly. 
For Kant an account of a just world-of a form of cosmopolitan 
justice in which boundaries may not be absent, but must be shown not 
to inflict injustice-begins with an account of the reasons we have for 
seeking principles that could be adopted by all. The Universal Prin-
ciple of justice formulates this requirement specifically for the public 
domain-the domain in which conflict is least avoidable-and legit-
imates constitutionally limited forms of state power within bounded 
territories. However, since there is no antecedent reason for think-
ing that states must be anything like those about which realists fan-
tasise, the way is left open for considering which sorts of interaction 
between all agents, including states, are compatible with justice and 
which are not. 
In my view this may provide a better starting point for thinking about 
justice beyond boundaries than the one Rawls offers, not only because 
the Kant's strategy of vindication aims deeper, but because it is more 
realistic and more open. The greater realism lies in the clear ac-
knowledgment that republican states are not in themselves just: they 
are a compromise we have to make in order to start securing freedom 
under real world conditions. By the same token the boundaries of 
these states are not intrinsically just: the particular filters they institu-
tionalise, the inclusions and the exclusions, the domination and the 
subordination which they secure, may constitute unjust action towards 
outsiders. If boundaries are a requirement of realism in the conduct 
of life, their construction and adjustment and the sorts of filters that 
they institutionalised is a matter of justice. 
In the world as we now know it, state boundaries are porous not in 
all but in many ways: they arc for the most part fairly porous to trans-
fers of goods and capital, communications, technologies, and rather 
less so to cultures and religions. The respects in which they arc least 
porous are to flows of people and of public finance. However, for Kant 
the status quo is never the end of the story. If we can find more just 
ways in which to structure boundaries in the world as it actually is, this 
will be a better implementation of the Universal Principle ojjustire. In 
the meantime we should not deceh•e ourselves by imagining that the 
power relations between states are exempt from considerations of jus-
tice, or that the degree of cosmopolitan justice we have established at 
the start of the twenty first century is all that might be achieved. 
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